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ANTITRUST POLICY AND THE
CONGLOMERATES
IRWIN M. STELZER*

I. DEFINITION

The conglomerate firm may, for working purposes, best be defined
as one involved in the production, distribution and/or sale of goods
or services that have no direct economic relation to one another.' A
conglomerate merger, then, is one which brings together two (or more)
2
firms into a diversified business entity.
By definition such a firm, whether it be the result of internal
growth, i.e., entry into alien markets without acquisition, or merger,
cannot have available to it most of the efficiencies usually cited as an
advantage of size. There can, it would seem, be no manufacturing
economies of scale in the traditional sense; nor can such entities be justified, for example, primarily on the ground of permitting fuller utilization of distribution or sales networks. This is noted so that focus
can be more clearly directed at the advantages conglomerates may
provide.
II.

THE DATA

First, the public policy controversy surrounding conglomerates
has been cast in terms of the competitive impact of conglomerating
mergers, not of conglomerating via internal expansion. Second, in 1968
these mergers accounted for 84 percent of the number and 89 percent
of the assets of all recorded large (over $10 million in assets) acquisitions.3 Finally, as Richard W. McLaren, Assistant Attorney General,
has noted: "The rules with respect to horizontal and vertical mergers
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I The term "conglomerate" will not be used here in what has been described as "a
strongly pejorative sense- to suggest wide or narrower meanings." See Address by Robert
W. Haack, Takeovers and Tenders: A Stock Exchange Viewpoint, National Conference of

The American Society of Corporate Secretaries, San Francisco, June 17, 1969.
2 One observer has noted that the word "diversification" has the same root as the
word "diversion," which latter word carries the following dictionary definition: "the act
of turning a person aside from this course; that which relaxes and amuses; a sport or
pastime." Cramston, Diversification of Ownership in the Regulated Industrieslore of Regulation, 68 PUB. Ur-L. FoRT. 456 (1961).
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are rather generally known and occasion little comment." 4 Commentators on mergers are thus left with conglomerates on which to ply
their trade.
There can be no doubt that the level of merger activity in the recent past has been at an all-time peak. The Federal Trade Commission
reported 4,003 mergers in 1968, as compared with 2,384 a year earlier
and 1,345 in 1960.r And these figures are by no means dominated by
minor acquisitions or insignificant acquirers. In 1968 almost 200 industrial firms with assets in excess of $10 million each - with assets
aggregating some $12.6 billion- were acquired. And the 200 largest
firms accounted for seventy-four of these large acquisitions, with aggregate assets of almost $7 billion.6 It has been estimated that the value
of assets acquired as a result of sell-outs by firms in the $19 million-plus
asset category may reach $18 billion in 1969, about fifty percent above
the 1968 level.7
Whether this level of merger activity is troublesome or not depends very much on the frame of reference of the observer. If one is
concerned with the traditional problem of concentration in specific
markets, these aggregate data are uninformative: they tell us nothing
about concentration and, presumably, the effectiveness of competition
in the steel, cement, textile or any other industry. If, on the other hand,
one's focus is the aggregate level of concentration of industrial assets
-

what has been termed "super-concentration"

-

these figures are

cause for alarm. Our Attorney General sees in them a threat to "our
economic, political and social structure":
Concentration of this magnitude is likely to eliminate existing and
potential competition. It increases the possibility for reciprocity
and other forms of unfair buyer-seller leverage. It creates nationwide marketing, managerial and financial structures whose enormous physical and psychological resources pose substantial barriers to small firms wishing to participate in a competitive market.
And, finally, super-concentration creates a "community of
interest" which discourages competition among large firms and
establishes a tone in the marketplace for more and more mergers.8
4 Address by Richard W. McLaren, Current Antitrust Division Policy on Mergers,
Acquisitions and Joint Ventures, Town Hall of California, Los Angeles, May 27, 1969,

at 6 (mimeo).
5 STATISICiAL R roRT, supra note 3, at 8.
6 ld. at 12.
7 Address by John N. Mitchell, Georgia Bar Assodation, Savannah, Georgia, June 6,
1969, at 3 (mimeo). Business Week has a somewhat contrary view, noting that a com-

bination of threatened tax code revisions, declining stock prices, tight money and high
acquisitions has caused a slowing in "the pace of the more spectacular, conglomerate-type
mergers...
Bus. W=EK, June 21, 1969, at 35.
8 Mitchell, supra note 7, at 4.
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An appraisal of this view follows, but it should first be noted that
it is most difficult to place these data in perspective. On the one hand,
it has been pointed out that acquired assets of large firms were equal
in amount to 44.6 percent of new plant and equipment expenditures
in 1968, as contrasted with about fifteen percent in most earlier years. 9
On the other hand, the 4,000-odd business corporations that disappeared by merger during 1968 has been termed
a small number compared with the twelve thousand that disappeared by failure, or the two hundred and seven thousand new corporations formed. Even the forty-three billion dollars in securities
exchanged in mergers that year was less than four per cent of the
market value of corporate securities.' 0
Even the "super-concentration" data lead different skilled observers to different conclusions. The Attorney General notes that the
share of manufacturing assets controlled by the 200 largest industrial
corporations has risen from forty-eight percent to fifty-eight percent
since 1948, and concludes that this poses a "danger."" But the Presidential Task Force on Antitrust Policy cites the rise to fifty-eight percent from fifty-five percent since 1957 in support of the view that
"concentration of aggregate economic activity . . . has changed only
12
slowly over time."'
The guidance offered by these aggregate data in formulating policy
toward conglomerates is, in any event, unclear. For nowhere has it
been shown that mergers in general, or conglomerate mergers in particular, have substantially contributed to any trends which may exist.
III. CAUSES

One fundamental cause of the wave of mergers in general, and
of conglomerating mergers in particular, is a change in the view of
the managerial function. There is a rising school of thought which
holds that business experience in a specific field is a less important
ingredient of success than general intelligence and managerial skill.
Backed by the rising usable capability of computers, increasingly welltrained business managers feel themselves specialized in techniques
with broad applicability: capital budgeting; personnel administration;
9The figures for 1960-68 were: 11.1%; 14.5%; 13.9%; 17.4%; 14.2%; 16.4%;
14.4%; 29.2%; and 44.6%. STATISTICAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 17.
10 Jacoby, The Conglomerate Corporation: Monster or Model of the Future?, THE
CENTER MAGAZINE, July 1969, at 43.
11 Mitchell, supra note 7, at 4.
12 1968 PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE REPORT ON ANTITRUST, 115 CONG. Rac. S 5642 (daily
ed. May 27, 1969) [hereinafter NEAL TASK FORCE REPORT].
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management systems. Their capabilities are, they feel, usable across
traditional industry lines.13 From this it follows that a well-managed
firm should be able to apply its skills to improve the performance of
any firm it may acquire. Two caveats are worth examining in this regard: first, whether this theory is consistent with the theory that existing management must be retained if a merger is to be successful;
second, the extent to which this view of the transferability of management assumes the existence of excess managerial capacity in the acquiring firm.14 But consideration should also be given to the question of
whether one's views concerning the correctness of this theory of management are relevant to the formulation of antitrust policy, particularly
if market forces provide correctives.
A second factor which has been responsible for many mergers, and
one which may temporarily be dominant, involves a combination of
stock market and tax considerations. High multiple companies can
offer extraordinary attractive capital gains deals, particularly to otherwise locked-in owners of closely-held corporations; they can, apparently,
transfer their multiples to the earnings of less well-regarded companies
by what one observer has termed "the chain-letter effect";' 5 taxdeductible interest payments can be substituted for dividends (which
must come from after-tax earnings) to permit take-overs at little or no
cost to the acquirer. It would appear that a combination of stock market conditions, tightened regulation by the New York Stock Exchange, 6
and tax code revisions will act to reduce the influence of these factors.
A third set of forces, closely related to the second, might be termed
financial factors. It has long been recognized, even by those suspicious
of the consequences of increased concentration and business size, that
the superior access of large firms to the capital markets is a "genuine
economic saving."'' 7 In addition, conglomerates often view potential
acquisition candidates as sources of cash and borrowing power. Cashrich, debt-free companies become take-over candidates for that reason
alone. But keep in mind that the basic reason these companies find
themselves in such a position is their failure to find growth opportunities which would employ that untapped financial strength, and a disinclination to return these funds, in the form of dividends, to the
13 In this connection see Jacoby, supra note 10, at 45.

14 See my earlier statement on economic concentration, Hearings on S. 2560 Before
the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th
Cong., 2d Sess., 181-204 (1964).
15 Burck, The Merger Movement Rides High, FORTUNE, Feb. 1969, at 81.
10 See Haack, supra note 1, at 7-8.
17 G. W. STOCKING & M. W. WATKINS, MONOPOLY AND FREE ENTErRIsE 76 (1951).
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stockholder-owners of the enterprise, i.e., to people who might themselves find alternative investment outlets for these funds.
A fourth force behind conglomeration is the ever-present desire to
reduce business risk, particularly that arising from broad long-term
changes in market demand. Certainly, recent acquisitions made by cigarette manufacturers have been the result, in part at least, of a desire
to hedge against possible secular declines in demand for cigarettes.' 8
There is no question that the economy has seen and will continue to
see different products rise and fall in consumer favor. For this reason
diversification into multiple-product lines does promise a reduction of
risk in the sense of reducing the exposure of the firm to shifts in consumer tastes.
A final cause of conglomeration is to be found, paradoxically, in
antitrust policy, at least as it was conceived prior to the current change
by Mr. McLaren. A survey recently conducted by National Economic
Research Associates revealed that many businessmen felt that the thenexisting merger guidelines of May 30, 1968 severely limited their ability to consummate horizontal or vertical mergers, but did not so restrict
conglomerate mergers. 19
IV.

PUBLIC POLICY

The public policy controversy surrounding conglomerate mergers
must be divided into two broad areas- traditional antitrust considerations and broader socio-economic problems.
The antitrust problem associated with the traditional merger case
increased concentration of a share of a definable market - is almost
non-existent. A conglomerate merger, by definition, does not increase
the market share of the acquiring firm. Perhaps the only real dangers
are (a) reciprocity and (b) subsidization.
There is no question that diversification enhances the possibility
of reciprocity. But neither is there any question that reciprocity is now
a widespread practice (although probably declining on a formalized
basis),20 and one which can be dealt with without preventing the mergers which create the potential for reciprocity. In fact, if it is reciprocity
which the Justice Department fears, it will also have to prevent diversification via internal growth, i.e., via new entry into various markets.
18 There is also a desire, if possible, to reduce risks incident to cyclical fluctuations
specific to an industry. See G. E. HALE & R. D. HALE, MARKEr Fown: SIzE AND SHAPE
UNDER THE SHERmAN

ACr 266 (1958).

19 See National Economic Research Associates, Corporate Reaction to the Merger
Guidelines, June 1969. See also NEAL TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 12.
20 Mitchell, supra note 7, at 9.
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But this it does not wish to do. Consequently, it should, to be evenhanded in the matter, take steps against the practice -reciprocityand not the mergers which, like internal growth, create the potential
for such a practice. And the Justice Department's belief that reciprocity
as a practice can be deterred without dissolution of the diversified
enterprise itself is reflected in its willingness to enter into a consent
decree to that effect with U.S. Steel. In fact, we again find a curious
dichotomy in antitrust policy. The slightest suggestion of potential
reciprocity brings a move against a conglomerate merger. But at the
same time the Justice Department sees no such danger inherent in onebank holding companies - this in a period of tight money and, in
many states, interest rate ceilings.
The second specific danger is that of subsidization. Professor Neil
H. Jacoby has cited the following as one of "several types of gains
21
from mergers [which] are, at least potentially, of value to society."
In addition, having a "long purse," it [the conglomerate] is in a
position to finance temporary operating losses of a subsidiary that
would bankrupt the latter if it were an independent firm. .... 22
But this view seems to me untenable. It involves stockholders in
losses they should not be called upon, often unknowingly, to bear; and
it results in a misallocation of resources, as well as in competitive injury to the efficient, nondiversified competitor. The latter finds himself faced with the competition of a division immune from the market
test of its efficiency, and from the penalty for inefficiency. A major
step toward the elimination of subsidization is divisional profit reporting, which should re-establish pressure on management to perform or
exit.23 Or perhaps, vigorous and novel enforcement of Robinson-Patman2 4 price discrimination prohibitions might help to prevent such
subsidization.
It should be noted that I have not listed the threat to potential
competition among the real dangers of conglomerate mergers. This is
because I am uncertain in my own mind as to its reality. Apparently,
it is hoped that by prohibiting entry-via-merger, we can induce conglomerates to enter an industry de novo. There can be no question
that, if these are indeed the alternatives, de novo entry would at least
provide a decrease in structural concentration. The firm which diversifies by merger, in essence, enters the market "in the preferred position
21Jacoby, supra note 10, at 47.
22 Id.
23 See SEC Securities Act Release No. 4,988 (July 14, 1969). In addition there have,

of course, been many instances of spin-offs of unprofitable divisions.
2415 U.S.C. § 13(2) (1964).
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of an established competitor. '2 5 But this leaves two important questions
unanswered. First, would the impact on competitive behavior (as opposed to structure) not perhaps be greater if the new management had
available to it an on-going organization to use as a competitive weapon?
Second, how realistic is it to assume that de novo entry is an alternative
in a significant number of instances? Parenthetically, one might wonder about a policy which is so concerned with the impact of conglomerate mergers on potential competition, while at the same time deems
it to be perfectly appropriate for companies to make major acquisitions
of firms directly in competition with the acquirer. I have in mind the
lack of expressed concern by the Justice Department with oil company
acquisitions of firms in the coal and nuclear industries. A policy which
permits dominant firms in one phase of the energy business to acquire
others in closely competitive phases, while at the same time seeks to
prevent a copper company from acquiring a coal company so as to
preserve "potential competition," seems curious.
These, then, are the more or less traditional antitrust criteria. An
equally important factor advanced in support of the drive against conglomerate mergers is the fear of "super-concentration." This argument
rests on the view that our antitrust laws are rooted in a social philosophy which abhors excessive concentration of economic power. Mr.
McLaren, for example, has noted that the antitrust laws seek to preserve competition because "it protects our political system by promoting a broad dispersion of economic power among the many, rather than
concentration in the hands of a few." '26
The conglomerate problem thus conceived arises, then, from our
reluctance to encourage further concentration of control of business
assets and decision making, in the face of our desire to obtain the competitive advantages to be gained by the entry of often already-powerful
newcomers into a specific field. This reluctance to encourage "superconcentration" is, as Mr. McLaren suggests, entirely consistent with our
antitrust statutes: the Sherman Act, 27 and the legislation subsequently
adopted to extend it, had a social purpose at least coordinate with its
economic purpose. 28 This has long been recognized by the jurists
charged with the interpretation of our antitrust laws. Mr. Justice
25 J. BuTrrRs, J. IaNTNER & W. CARY, EFFECTS OF TAxATION: CORPORATE MERGERS 224
(1951).
26 McLaren, supra note 4, at 3.
27 15 U.S.C. § 1 et. seq. (1964).
28 For a full and excellent discussion of this, see H. THORELLI, THE FEDaL. ANmrrRusr
PoLicY (1954).
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Peckham, as early as 1897, noted that greater efficiency and lower prices
which might result from "trusts" might restrain trade "by driving out
of business the small dealers and worthy men whose lives have been
spent therein"; 29 Judge Learned Hand referred to the belief "that
great industrial consolidations are inherently undesirable, regardless
of their economic results"; 30 Mr. Justice Douglas graphically listed
"loss in citizenship" and dilution of "local leadership" as prices paid
when "[c]lerks responsible to a superior in a distant place take the
place of resident proprietors beholden to no one." 31
What these jurists are saying, in essence, is that even if the preservation of small, independent businessmen involves a sacrifice of efficiency- and nowhere has such an argument been conclusively proved
- such a sacrifice is a small price to pay for the social-political benefits
of a society in which economic power is widely diffused. And most
economists would be inclined to agree. Thus, Joel B. Dirlam and
Alfred E. Kahn have noted that conflicts between "economic welfare"
and other values "are the order of the day. They are resolved pretty
much on the assumption that neither one side nor the other invariably
takes precedence. The resolution of these conflicts of interest and values
is a political, not an economic function. ' 32 They go on to note:
Clearly we are not devoted to a competitive system only for "economic" reasons. It is also associated with such social and political
ideals as the diffusion of private power and maximum opportunities for individual self-expression. If the economy will run itself,
33 ,
governmental interference in our daily life is held to a minimum

But the social arguments are not unambiguous in the case of conglomerates. First, it is not at all clear that conglomerate merger between large firms reduces the probably already-non-existent scope of
enterprise available to individual entrepreneurs. Second, it is entirely
possible that this form of enterprise provides an opportunity for newcomers to rise to positions of economic power, introduce new ways of
financing and managing businesses, and unseat entrenched managements. This may be just the fluidity the antitrust laws seek to preserve.
As noted previously, Attorney General Mitchell has admonished that
conglomerate mergers may "indeed be a threat to our.., social struc29 United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166

U.S. 290, 323 (1897).

30 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
31 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 319 (1949) (dissenting opinion).
32 J. DiR.AM: S. A. KAHN, FAIR COMP'a'rON: THE LAw AND ECONOMICS OF ANTrrRUST
PorICY 8-9 (1954).
33 Id. at 9.
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ture. ' '34 But they may be a "threat" in a very different sense from that
implied by the Attorney General. When the respected London Economist reported on the move against the LTV-Jones 9c Laughlin merger,
it noted:
Outside Washington a discreet cheer for the suit against Ling was
raised in the boardrooms of the big steel companies; the steel
trade unions liked it too. A raider like Ling-Temco-Vought is an
instant and unwelcome competitor to the established giants, and
with its higher earnings multiples can even threaten to buy them
out. As for the unions, they find it harder to bring a multi-product
company like Ling to its knees in a dispute than a mammoth but
almost single-product company.8 5
The Economist further reported that denizens of "crustier boardrooms . . . resentful or fearful old-line businessmen" were enthusiastic
in their support for statutory and other changes needed "to block the
new men," and had warned that the LTV-Jones 8c Laughlin suit "can
be criticized as protecting established industry (and the highly concentrated steel industry at that) against a newcomer."3 And Senator
Philip A. Hart, Chairman of the Senate Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee, wondered about the sudden spurt in interest in attacking
new, but not "established," diversified firms in an attempt "to maintain the status quo."3 7 There are, after all, "dose to a dozen apparently
traditional U.S. corporations . . . which possess a breadth of unrelated diversification at least as great as that of the so-called conglomerates."38
The direction in which policy is pushed by social considerations,
is, then, not clear. Conglomerate mergers would appear to provide,
in many instances, the only realistic possibility of entry by a newcomer
- management with, perhaps, a different view of things such as the
efficacy of price competition - into concentrated industries. They often
provide, in their take-over bids and threats, an opportunity for stockholders to unseat otherwise all-but-impregnable, self-perpetuating
managements.8 9
84

Mitchell, supra note 7, at 3.

85 Biting the Hand of Business, THE ECONOMIST, April 5, 1969, at 35.
86 THE ECONOMIST, supra note 35, at 36. See also Cameron, It's open season

on conglomerates, and established business couldn't be happier,FORTUNE, May 1, 1969, at 43.
87 Remarks by Senator Hart, lawyers Club of the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor,
Michigan, April 8, 1969, at 2 (mimeo).
38 The Multicompanies: Conglomerate, Agglomerate and In-Between, FoRms, Jan. 1,
1969, at 77.
89 "The recent merger wave, especially the take-over bid, has powerfully revived the
influence of stockholders." Got A Light, McLaren?, FORTUNE, May 1, 1969, at 62 (editorial).
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CONCLUSIONS

The social factors which must be given consideration in the formulation of antitrust policy are, in the case of conglomerate mergers,
an ambiguous guide. It is not at all clear whether the open economic
society which is generally accepted as a legitimate goal can best be
achieved by opposing or permitting this form of asset turnover. I am
not persuaded that it would be wise to restrict conglomerates from
acquiring companies which are leaders in their industries, as has been
suggested both by the Task Force Report on Antitrust Policy 40 and the
Attorney General. 41 These companies are often "sleeping giants," perhaps ranking among the top ten in their industry, perhaps long accustomed to "going along and getting along." A new view of price policy,
delivery schedules, inventory policy, backed by the financial and managerial muscle possessed by conglomerates, might prove a breath of
fresh air. Textron, for example, long made it a practice to acquire
firms that dominated their (small) industries. 42 I have seen no demonstration that competition in any relevant market was injured thereby.
Nor do I see as real a danger of long-run unprofitable operation
of divisions as once existed. First, divisional profit reporting should have
some effect. Second, institutional investors are becoming both more
sophisticated and more powerful; witness the impact of their reported
43
reaction to Dillingham's flirtation with the purchase of United Fruit.

We may well see a widespread emulation of Textron's practice of
44
weeding out its less successful divisions.
The stimulus to conglomerate mergers provided by tax policy and
stock market conditions will be much diluted in the future. Such
mergers as will nevertheless occur will, I would guess, run into antitrust flak and will survive it if they can mount more-or-less traditional
defenses. The next several years should provide some indication of the
economic viability of the conglomerates which have been assembled.
Indeed, we shall see whether the new breed of managers can manage,
as well as assemble, large, diversified enterprises.
40 NEAL TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 12. The reasoning of the Report on this
point is obscure. It apparently deems purchase of a small firm "more likely to increase
competition and to decrease concentration in a concentrated industry than if the large
firm simply acquired a leading firm in the industry and settled for maintaining or
modestly increasing the market share of that firm." This is, of course, true; but we have
no basis for assuming that growth-oriented conglomerates will settle for maintenance of
their market shares.
41 Mitchell, supra note 7, at 15.
42 Call It "Phase Three," FORBES, Dec. 1, 1968, at 23.
43 Bring on the Big Five, FORBES, Dec. 1, 1968, at 28.
44 Biel, Stock Analysis, FoamBs, Feb. 15, 1968, at 62.

